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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: DEFENSE IN RETRIAL FOR
GREATER OFFENSE UPON REVERSAL OF CONVICTION
OF LESSER OFFENSE
IN a new trial secured upon appeal from a conviction, it is dear that
a defendant cannot assert a claim of double jeopardy.1 Less dear, how-
ever, is the efficacy of such a plea if the defendant was originally con-
victed of a lesser included offense than that charged and is again faced,
in the new trial, with a charge of the greater offense.2
This problem was pointedly raised in the recent case of Green v.
United States.3 There, the defendant, who had been indicted for
murder in the first degree and convicted of murder in the second de-
gree,4 was accorded a new trial on appeal. Subsequently, he was retried
1 See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (.1947). See also McGinn v. State, 46 Neb. 427, 44i, 65
N.W. 46, 49 (1895), where it is stated that "To attempt an examination of the cases
holding that the accused, in a criminal prosecution, by procuring a reversal of the
conviction, waives his right to object to a second trial on the ground that he has once
been put in jeopardy, would be a work of supererogation."
' Even the innocent defendant might hesitate to appeal a conviction where the
penalty imposed was imprisonment, if the specter of a death penalty is present. Of
course, there may be only the tactical question, and the major concern is whether
the fundamental constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is violated.
Somewhat similarly, it has been suggested that what is required is drastic legislative
revision of the rules applicable to double jeopardy, in order to avoid the greatly in-
creased danger to the defendant is a criminal case, that has resulted in the vastly in-
creased number of penal statutes and the rise of the multiple count indictment. See
Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Mori-
bund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 368 (z956).
a236 F.zd 708 (D.C.-Cir. 1956); cert. granted, 352 U.S. 915 (1956); docketed
25 U.S.L. WEEK 364 (Nov. 27, 1956) (No. 589); docketed for reargument, 26
U.S.L. WEEK 3018 (July 23, 2957).
'The usual practice is that homicide is divided into various degrees of murder and
manslaughter. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 90-94 (1934). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § x4-
17 to x9; N.Y. PEN. CODE § 1044 (first degree murder), § 1046 (second degree
murder), § 1049 (manslaughter), § xo5o (manslaughter in first degree), § 1o52 (man-
slaughter in second degree). See also 6z STAT. 756 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §2111 (1952).
To a lesser extent a similar practice has developed in other offenses such as robbery
and rape.
In England, where no such classification is recognized by law, differentiation is
made in practice by the jury., 117 JUST. P. 750 (953).
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on the same indictment, and again was convcited-but this time as
charged.5 A sharply divided Court of Appeals affirmed this second
conviction,6 rejecting the plea of double jeopardy7 on the apparent
authority of Trono v. United States,' where, in a similar situation, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Peckham, concluded that
this defense had, in effect, voluntarily been waived by the appeal.0
Although recognizing that the conviction of the lesser offense might
conceivably constitute an implied acquittal of the greater,10 the Court
' Defendant was originally convicted of murder in the second degree under the second
count of the indictment. He did not appeal from the conviction, under the first count,
of arson. 218 F.zd 856 (x955). The basis of the reversal was that the court con-
cluded that the trial judge had erred in giving an instruction on second degree murder,
and that defendant was-guilty of first degree murder or nothing.
a See note 3, supra.
'Judge Miller, with the concurrence of Judges Washington, Danaher, Bastian and
Burger, said for the court that the defendant had not been subjected to double jeopardy
(Judge Prettyman concurred also, basing his concurrence on the fact that he could see
no escape from the Trono case, note 8 infra). 236 F.zd 708, 712 (x956).
Judge Fahy, in an opinion accepted by Chief Judge Edgerton and Judge Bazelon,
stated that the defendant should not be tried again for first degree murder, since such an
action would violate his constitutional right not to be placed in jeopardy a second time.
236 F.2d 708, 71S (1956).
8199 U.S. 521 (2905).
'The controlling decision, Trono, is thus fifty-two years old and, when decided, was
a relatively weak pronouncement, with only four of the Justices concurring in the result
and reasoning. The opinion was written by Justice Peckham with the concurrence of
Justices Brewer, Brown and Day, with Justice Holmes concurring in the result. See
199 U.S. 5z, 535 (19o5). Mr. Justice McKenna wrote a dissenting opinion which
was concurred in by Justice White and Justice Harlan, who also wrote a separate dis-
senting opinion. The Chief Justice, Fuller, also dissented, apparently without opinion.
199 U.S. 521, 540 (1905).
There was an effort on the part of counsel for Green to show that the Trono
(Peckham) opinion was not that of the court, but this failed, and it is certain that the
result was the opinion of the court as then constituted. 236 F.ad 708, 71! (1956).
"0 Strong support is found in many state courts for the view that the subsequent
conviction is double jeopardy. See Annot. 59 A.L.R. xx6o (x92) for a collection of
cases. See also, Thomas v. State, 255 Ala. 632, 53 So.zd 340 (x95x), where the trial
proceeded under a valid indictment for first degree murder and a verdict of guilty
of murder in the second degree was returned, it was held to be a bar to trial for first
degree murder in the new trial5 Hearn v. State, 21a Ark. 360, 205 S.W.zd 477 (1947),
where defendant, indicted for murder in first degree and found guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, obtained a reversal because of judge's remark to jury, and where it was
held that defendant, in the new trial, could not be convicted of any higher offense than
voluntary manslaughter, as he was deemed acquitted of all greater degrees of homicide.
A restriction of the rule is noted in cases such as State v. Goodson, 54 N.M. 184, 217
P.2d 262 (295o), where it was said that a conviction of assault would generally bar
subsequent conviction of rape, but not in the case where defendant had pleaded guilty to
assault before a mayor's court in order to escape trial for rape. The Virginia court,
in the Trono case had stated that "the better doctrine is ...that the
reversal of the judgment opens up the whole controversy and acts upon'
the original judgment as if it had never been."'" And that it rationalized'
this conclusion upon a waiver theory was thus made unequivocally
explicit:
[W] e do not agree to the view that the accused has the right to
limit his waiver as to jeopardy, when he appeals from a judgment
against him. . . . [I]f the defendant chooses to appeal ...
he thereby waives, if successful, his right to avail himself of
the former acquittal of the greater offense .... 12
Nevertheless, in the Green case, the court, while ostensibly adhering
in Lee v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 360, 49 S.E.zd 6o8 (1948), said a defendant con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter could not, in the new trial, be found guilty of any
higher degree of homicide, and, in Leigh v. Commonwealth, 1g1 Va. 583, 66 S.E.2d
586 (195i), that a conviction of second degree murder is an acquittal of first degree.
See ALl MODEL PENAL CODE, §§ 123-25 (April 1956 Draft) and Trono v. United
States, 199 U.S. 521, 540 (1905) (dissenting opinion) for collections of cases.
California has a peculiar situation, in that there murder in the first degree and
murder in the second degree are treated as one offense for the purpose of this rule. As
to other offenses, the California courts follow the rule that would bar the subsequent
conviction. See People v. McNeer, 14 Cal.App.2d 22, 57 P.2d 1o18 (1936), where
defendant was indicted for murder and convicted of second degree. He secured a new
trial and was convicted of murder in the first degree. On appeal, the court said that
defendant had not been acquitted of murder in the original trial, but, rather, he was
convicted of murder as there was only one offense defined as murder. See also People
v. Spreckels, 125 Cal.App.zd 507, 513, 270 P.2d 513, 517 (1954).
See Jones v. State, 144 Miss. 52, xo9 So. 265 (1926), 59 A.L.R. 1146 (1929), for
a statement of the view that the subsequent conviction is not double jeopardy. Cases are
collected in Annot., 59 A.L.R. 116o (1929). See also Notes, 7' U.S.L. REV. 421
(1937); 23 TUL. L. REa. 575 (1949); 2 VAND. L. REV. 701 (1949).
Apparently, there have been some changes in position by several state courts. See
Ex parte Byrd, 157 Tex. Crim. App. 595, 251 S.W.zd 537 (1952). The general
theory is often stated to be that upon the new trial, it is as if no trial had ever been
held. State v. Higgins, 252 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1952 ) 5 Anglin v. Patterson, 121 Okla.
io6, 24 8 Pac. 632 (1926). See also District of Columbia v. Huffman (D.C. Mun.
Ct. App.) 42 A.2d 502 (1945) (and cases cited in n. 9, at 5o4).
" "It does not appear to us to be a practice founded on solid reason to permit such
a limited waiver by an accnsed party . . ." Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 534
(i9o5). See also Notes, 71 U.S.L. REV. 421, 424 (x937); 23 TUL. L. REV. 575, 576,
(1949); 2 VAND. L. REV. 701, 702 (1949). And see, more recently, Note, 66 YALE
L.J. 59z (1957) where the cases are categorized as "limited" waiver cases, as opposed
to "absolute" waiver. (This note contains an analysis of the general jeopardy problem
raised in the Green case.)
12 199 U.S. 521, 533 (1905).
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to'" and quoting exclusively from the Trono case, conspicuously avoided
the use of similar "waiver" language."4 Instead, it seemed, rather, prin-
cipally to stress the fact of Mr. Justice Holmes' concurrence in that case
as the basis of its precedental value.15 It is significant, therefore, that
while Mr. Justice Holmes, indeed, perceived no double jeopardy in the
Trono case, he had expressly rejected the waiver doctrine propounded
there by the Court only a few months earlier in Kepner v. United
States.'0 In fact, it was probably for this reason that he felt compelled
to enter a separate concurrence in the Trono case. More appealing
to Mr. Justice Holmes than the theory of waiver was one of "single
jeopardy"--4.e., that jeopardy attaches and remains unaffected until
final disposition of the case. Accordingly, despite the explicit formula-
tion of the waiver theory in the Trono case, on which nominal reliance
was placed, the Green case, viewed in the respect mentioned, suggests
the possible adoption of this single jeopardy theory it its stead17
23 36 F.2d 708, 7X1 (1956). "Thus the Peckham holding which is applicable
here. 
" The significance of the omissions is best illustrated by a presentation of the state-
ments uqed in Green with the omissions included: (Omissions italicized) "In our opinion
the better doctrine ... (see text to note x x supra). The accused by his own action has
obtained a reversal of the whole judgment, and we see no reason why he should not,
upon a new trial, be proceeded against as if no trial had previously taken place.
We do not agree to the view that the accused has the right to limit his waiver as to
jeopardy, when he appeals from a judgment against him .... No power can wrest
from him the right to so use that judgment, but if he chooses to appeal from it and to
ask for its reversal he thereby waives, if successful, his right to avail himself of the
former acquittal of the greater offense...
C. ... And this is generally put upon the ground that by appeal he waives his right
to the plea. . . . This holding shows that there can be a waiver of the defense by
reason of the action of the accused. As there is, therefore, a waiver in any event...
the accused waives the right.... When at his own request he has obtained a new trial
he must take the burden with the benefit, and go back for a new trial of the whole case.
It does not appear to us to be a practice founded on solid reason to permit such a limited
waiver by an accused party, while himself asking for a reversal of the judgment."
Compare 236 F.2d 708, 710, 711 (1956) with 199 U.S. 521, 533, 534 (19o).
15236 F.zd 708, 711 (1956). The court in Green made the effort, saying that
"the distinguished Holmes had affirmatively asserted that [the Peckham (Trono) doc-
trine] to be the better doctrine," but this conclusion stems from a fundamental mis-
conception of the view of Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner. See note 17 infra.
18Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 535 (i905). In Kepner v. United States,
195 U.S. 00o, 134 (1904) (dissenting opinion), Justice Holmes said (195 U.S. at
135): "It cannot matter that the prisoner procures the second trial. In a capital case
. .. a man cannot waive, and certainly will not be taken to waive without meaning it,
fundamental constitutional rights." And again (195 U.S. at 136): "I have seen no
other, except the suggestion of waiver, and that I think cannot stand."1 This idea is re-enforced by the omissions, note 14 supra, and the obvious effort to
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The dissenters in the Green case, on the other hand, urged that
conviction of second degree murder constituted acquittal of first degree
murder, that the appeal did not bring this acquittal before the court, and
that there was not, accordingly, any waiver of the double jeopardy
defense with respect to the first degree murder charge."' They dis-
tinguished the Trono case on the basis of a sai generis procedure em-
ployed there, which permitted the whole case to be reviewed and tried
de novo in the appellate court, 9 but did not address themselves at all
to the single jeopardy theory.
This case is now before the Supreme Court, 0 and its resolution may
have a significance broader than is readily apparent on the prosecution of
appeals in.criminal cases. If the Court either reverses the circuit court
or, in upholding it, reaffirms its adherence to the Trono-or waiver-
doctrine, prosecution appeals in federal cases will, apparently, continue
to be regarded unconstitutional.2 If, however, the Court should affirm
put Justice Holmes with the majority. The single jeopardy doctrine is succinctly
gated by Justice Holmes: ". . . it seems to me that logically and rationally a man
cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same case, however often he
1pay be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the
end of the cause." Kepner v. United States, x95 U.S. too, 134 (19o4) (dissentingopinion) (emphasis added).
18 236 F.2d 7o8, 711 (x956).
19 236 F.2d 708, 718 (1956) (dissenting opinion). But this seems to be a rather
forced distinction since the Trono (Peckham) opinion stated that the case was being
considered "as if it arose in one of the Federal courts in this country." x99 U.S. 521,
530 (.9o5).
It should be noted that under the procedure rules of the Philippine Islands, the
Supreme Court of the Philippines had the power to review both questions of law and
fact, and the power to reverse a judgment, in effect retrying the whole matter. See
the statement of the Solicitor General for the United States, 199 U.S. 521, 525 (1905).
Actually, the claim was that the conviction of homicide, by the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands, placed them in double jeopardy in "violation of the Declaration
of Rights in section 5 of the Civil Government Act of July x, 1902, 32 STAT. 691."
Id. at 522. The language of the Act is substantially that of the Bill of Rights set
forth in the amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
20 See note 3 supra.
" For general studies of this topic see Miller, 4ppeals by State in Criminal Law
Cases, 36 YALF L.J. 4.86 (1927); Horack, Prosecution 4ppeals in West Virgitia,
41 W. VA. L.Q. 50 (1934). See also Notes, to Miss. L.J. 284 (1938) (commenting
on Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)
, 
which upheld a state statute granting
the right of appeal to the state as not being a violation of the Constitution of the
United States); 24 IND. L. REV. 547 (1949) ; 12 Caim. L. REV. 385 (938); 3 S.C.
L.Q. 162 (1950); 7 MONTANA L. REv. 56 (1946) (discussing the Palko case and also
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. oo (19o4), where the constitutionality of such a
federal statute was denied); 12 MD. I;. REV. 68 (195x)5 22 U. CIN. L. REv. 463
(x953) (containing a criticism of the fact that the state does not have the right to
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the lower decision and, in so doing, expressly adopt the single jeopardy
theory of Mr. Justice Holmes,2 2 prosecution appeals would, thereafter,
be constitutional-indeed, it was to this end that this rationale originally
was articulated.
Apparently, the jaundiced view widely taken toward prosecution
appeals is an outgrowth of ancient conditions. To mitigate the preju-
dicial treatment to which the defendant commonly was subjected,23
countervailing safeguards such as this were gradually developed. Thus,
too, for example, in the absence of a right of appeal by the prosecution,"'
or where such right is narrowly restricted,2 errors of the defense can-
not be raised in the appellate courts.m" Since the underlying policy
justifications no longer have great validity, however, the considerations
appeal and concluding (at 467) that "no harm could possibly come from a statute
which gave the state the right to appeal").
For an analysis of the narrow right of appeal by the government in federal cases, see
Note, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 631 (1953).
"Described as "more desirable" but not having much support in the cases. Note,
2 VAND. L. REV. 701, 703 (x949). The only case there cited in State v. Lee, 65
Conn. 265, 3o Atl. Tlxo (1894), which involved an appeal by the state in a criminal
case, but in State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, io N.W.2d 117 (1943), the single jeopardy
view of Justice Holmes is expressly adopted. See also Note, 22 U. CIN. L. REV. 463
(1953), for a favorable analysis of the doctrine and, more recently, a careful study
of the problem and state constitutional provisions in Note, 45 Ky. L.J. 628 (19S7).
For an extremely critical view of the result of the Kepner decision and the resulting
problems in the Philippine Republic, see Maurico, The Need for a New Approach to the
Doctrine of Double Jeopardy, 29 PHIL. LJ. 48! 6954).
" WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (zd ed. 1923) 994. See also 3 CHITTY, ENGLISH STATUTES
2iz n. (i) (6th ed. 1912); People v. Fochtman, 226 Mich. 53, 197 N.W. 166
(1924). See also i STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1883) at 222, 447
(torture) ; at '223, 377, 422 (unjudicial conduct of magistrates) ; at 4z8 (political in-
terest of government in trials) ; at 415 (oppression of accused persons generally), all
cited in Miller, Apeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 49! (19-7).
See also, Horack, Prosecution .ppeals in West Virginia, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 50 (1934);
io MiSs. LJ. 284, 288 (938).
" Illinois, Massachusetts, and Texas do not allow the state any appeal. Until
recently, Georgia, Florida and Minnesota likewise allowed no appeal to the prosecu-
tion, but the legislatures in those states have adopted provisions similar to that em-
bodied in the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure. In effect these
provisions state that the state is entitled to appeal from various rulings of the court,
not in such a manner as to effect an acquittal. ALI CODE OF CRIM. PRO., § 440 (1930).
"'Commonwealth v. Prall, 146 Ky. xo9, 142 S.W. 202 (1912). In Michigan and
'Pennsylvania, the state is allowed the right of review of a judgment in favor of de-
fendant if it is rendered prior to the verdict of the jury. People v. Swift, 59 Mich.
529, 26 N.W. 694 (1886); Commonwealth v. Capp, 48 Pa. 53 (x864).
" See Horack, Prosecution Appeals in West Virginia, 41 W. VA. L. REV. 50 934),
for an analysis of the views of a number of prosecutors on the problems presented by
the absence of a right of appeal in the prosecution.
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usually urged today in support of these defense-oriented restrictions tend
to emphasize the right to trial by jury,27 the increased hardship that
would otherwise be visited on the defendant, 28 and the already excessive
volume of appeals which would thereby be greatly augmented.2 0
Adamant objections to prosecution appeals has, nevertheless, oc-
casioned sharp criticism in some quarters.30 The most cogent, perhaps,
is that, albeit unconsciously, it may induce a judge, in dose questions, to
decide invariably in favor of the defendant, to the consequent impair-
ment of the sound administration of justice.3 1  There has, however, been
no significant deviation from this rule in the federal courts,32 although
statutes permitting prosecution appeals in state courts have been upheld
27 3 BL. COMM. 379 states the somewhat hallowed doctrine, but as recently as
1954, this view was echoed by the late Rt. Hon. Sir Travers Humphreys who wrote,
"I cannot bring myself to believe that there are any persons other than the inmates of
a lunatic asylum who would vote in favour of the abolition of trial by jury in serious
criminal cases." CRIM. L. REV. 457, 459 (July, 1956).
However, there is much dissenting opinion as to the significance of jury trials, and
it is stated that during a particular period eighty-six percent of convictions in trial
courts were on guilty pleas, six percent on findings of the court acting as a jury, and
only eight percent by a jury determination of guilt. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OP
CRIMINOLOGY 289 (4 th ed. 1947).
For more recent analyses of the right to jury trial, see Notes, 46 J. CraM. L. (Eng.)
512 (955); 32 L.A. BAR BULL. 35 (1956); 29 CONN. BAR J. 229 (1955).
For a scholarly, practical, experienced view of jury trials, see FRANx, CouRTs ON
TRIAL (1949), especially p. 22o ("It will not do . . . to make Fourth-of-July
speeches about the glorious jury system, to conceal its grave defects, or merely to palliate
them . . 1"). Apparently Judge Frank would abandon jury trials save in certain grave
criminal cases.
The view has been expressed that a cut-off point is a necessary limitation on the state
right of appeal, and that that point is where there has been a jury determination not
acting under instruction. Under this view, state appeals would be allowed, but curtailed
because of the right to jury trial. See Note, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 545, 553 (-955),
where the whole problem as related to New Jersey decisions, statutes and constitutional
provisions is discussed.
" See Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE LU. 486, 500 (1927)
see also Note, 32 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 87, 89 (.94.).
.- See Notes, x TEXAS LAW & LEGis. 152 (1947). But cf. Miller, Appeals by the
State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 5oo (1927) at 5oo, where an analysis of
a case in Connecticut illustrates that this is not always true.
"0 See Miller, id.; Horack, Prosecution Appeals in West Virginia, 41 W. VA. L. REV.
50 (1934) 2 o MIss. L.J. 284 (1938) ; 24 IND. L. REV. 547 (1949) 5 32 J. CRiM. L.,
C. & P.S. 87 (1941); 12 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1938); 3 S.C.L.Q. 162 (295o) ; 12
MD. L. REV. 68 (1950) ; 22 U. ClN. L. REv. 463 (953).
a1 See Note, 2o Miss. L.J. 284, 289-90 (2938)5 Miller, Appeals by the State in
Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 511 (1927).
32 See note xg, supra.
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as meeting the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.8"
The result in cases such as Green and Trono has been said to rest
on such tacit policy considerations as jury leniency and the fact that,
under certain circumstances, a reversal would be tantamount to complete
acquittal.84 So compelling are these considerations believed to be that the
Court has been forced to devise techniques effectively to circumvent the
double jeopardy barrier. If, however, the injunction against double
jeopardy will yield to such considerations, then it would seem to be even
more vulnerable to the more significant demands that prosecution appeals
be permitted in the interest of effective judicial adminstration. The tradi-
tional doctrine of waiver by reason of appeal, it is true, cannot be used
by the Court to justify this result. But there is available a respectable
and at least equally persuasive alternative rationale in the single jeopardy
view of Justice Holmes.3 5 Adoption of this thesis would satisfy the un-
derlying policy considerations in the Trono and Green situations," avoid
the dubious waiver argument81 and, moreover, enable the federal
courts considerably to further the more effective administration of justice.
88Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The Supreme Court held that there
was nothing in the United States Constitution that prohibited the State of Connecticut
from granting the right of appeal, after a trial on the merits, to the prosecution when
there was dissatisfaction with the verdict rendered by the trial court. This appeal
might be from an acquittal or an unsatisfactory conviction. The federal bill of rights,
including the double jeopardy clause, was held not to apply to state action of this
kind. Thus, if the state has no prohibition of its own against double jeopardy, it can
provide for what would amount to double jeopardy in the federal courts.
"'These policy factors are most recently discussed in a rather perceptive analysis
of the jeopardy problem raised by the Green case. See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 592, 597 &
n. 27 (5956). Defendant Green was originally convicted of arson and second degree
murder.
The Government's case was based on the felony murder doctrine [under D.C. CoDe
ANN. § 22-2401 (.95)], which does not require proof of a specific intent to
kill, and, thus, in a retrial on the first degree murder count, the prosecution would
not likely be able to secure a conviction since it would be unable to shomi intent. The
arson conviction was not appealed and would not be at issue in the new trial. But
cf. Note, 66 YALE L.J. 427 (1956), pointing up the anachronistic nature of felony
murder as a first degree offense and urging its abolition, suggesting that malice afore-
thought of the felony committed could sustain a conviction of second degree murder.
It is, however, suggested in this same Note that even in the absence of the felony
murder doctrine, the felon who sets fire to an occupied building might be said to have
premeditated and deliberated.
'See notes 15 and x6, supra, and text thereto.
'
8 See note 29, supra, and text thereto.
37See generally introductory paragraphs hereto.
